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TUITION AS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
David Gray Carlson*
Bankruptcy trustees are suing universities because the insolvent parent
of an adult student has written a tuition check while insolvent. The
theory is that the university is the initial transferee of a fraudulent
transfer that has provided benefit to the student but not to the parent
debtor. This Article claims that the university is never the initial
transferee of tuition dollars. Rather, the student is. Where the
university has no knowledge of parent insolvency, the university can
count educating the student as a good faith transfer for value, thus
immunizing the university from liability. The unpleasant side effect is
that the student is liable as the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer,
and this liability is not dischargeable should the adult student seek
refuge in bankruptcy.
Fraudulent acts are as varied as fish in the sea.1

Parents frequently cover the tuition expense of their adult children.
Sometimes they do so when insolvent.
Bankruptcy trustees have started to claim that the colleges and graduate
schools that receive tuition from insolvent parents are fraudulent transferees in
the parents’ bankruptcy proceeding.2 Tuition payments can be sizable—sixfigure numbers stretching over a few years, in some cases.3
Until recently, the issue has been whether the school gives value directly to
the parents when their adult children are elevated to the determination of
thinking reason.4 Some courts have found that the insolvent parent receives a
reasonably equivalent value. Accordingly, no fraudulent transfer occurs when
the insolvent parent pays the tuition bill.5 Other courts have found no benefit to

*

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1583 (2d Cir. 1983).
2
See Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Trustees Claw Back College Tuition Paid for Filers’ Kids, WALL ST. J.
(May 5, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-trustees-claw-back-college-tuition-paid-for-filerskids-1430869820. See generally Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking
to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2158 (2019) (reporting on 152
tuition cases, all but one instigated since 2006).
3
See, e.g., Pergament v. Hofstra Univ. (In re Adamo), 582 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d,
595 B.R. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (college sued for $121,388).
4
See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 123 (A.V. Miller trans.,
Prometheus Books 1969) (1812) (“The determination of man is thinking reason”).
5
The leading case is Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013).
1
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the parent.6 Accordingly, the schools must return tuition dollars to the parent’s
bankruptcy trustee.
Recently, the district court in Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School7 assumed
that tuition payments by an insolvent parent are fraudulent transfers. But it
outlined a legal fiction under which the school may or may not be liable to the
bankruptcy trustee of the parent. According to this fiction, when a school takes
tuition in advance of fall registration and promises a refund if the student does
not register, the school is a “mere conduit” of the tuition and therefore not a
transferee of the tuition dollars. Under this fiction, the adult child becomes the
initial transferee of the tuition dollars, not the school. Later, when the school
delivers an education, the school is a transferee of the student’s dollars. If the
school in good faith later delivers the education, the school is a transferee of
fraudulently transferred tuition dollars, but it avoids liability by virtue of the
bona fide transfer defense in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1). Under § 550(b)(1),
the bankruptcy trustee may not recover from “a transferee that takes for value,
including satisfaction . . . of a present . . . debt, in good faith, and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided . . . . ”8
Weirdly, under the Brooklyn Law School reasoning, if tuition payments are
overdue when the education commences, the school is the initial transferee of
the tuition dollars. The § 550(b)(1) defense is not available to “initial
transferees.”9 The university’s only defense is provided by § 548(c): a transferee
of a transfer fraudulent under § 548(a) that “takes for value and in good
faith . . . may retain any interest transferred . . . to the extent that such
transferee . . . gave value to the debtor in exchange . . . .”10 As a result, the
school can defend itself only by proving that it gave value directly to the
insolvent parent. If the school gives value to the student but not to the parent,
the school has received a fraudulent transfer and so must regurgitate tuition to
the parent’s bankruptcy trustee.
Under the Brooklyn Law School test, timing determines whether a school is
the initial transferee of the student and thus the transferee of a transferee of the
bankrupt parent (no liability), or whether the school is the initial transferee of

6

The leading case is DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir.

2019).
7

Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019).
9
§ 550. The defense applies only if the trustee proceeds under § 550(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) covers “any
immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.”
10
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added).
8
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the parent (strict liability).11 If payment precedes registration day, the school is
safe. If payment occurs after registration day, the school must disgorge:
Whether the schools exercise dominion and control over tuition
payments immediately upon receipt thus depends on when each
particular payment is made . . . . [I]n the case of any tuition paid early
enough that the recipient school would have been obligated to refund
it to the student if he or she then withdrew, the school must be
classified as a mere conduit and the student an initial transferee,
regardless of whether the student actually withdrew from school. But
as for tuition paid so late that the student could never have had any
right to obtain it, even had he or she withdrawn from school
immediately, the school had dominion and control from the outset and
thus is properly considered the initial transferee.12

How could the district court in Brooklyn end up articulating such an absurd rule?
The answer is that the court relied on Bonded Financial Services v. European
American Bank,13 the leading case in tripartite fraudulent transfers cases. In such
cases, a debtor (whom I shall call D) wishes to enrich a third party (X). D does
so by sending funds to a creditor of X (CX) or vendor (V) of X. In the context of
tuition, D is the parent, X is an adult child, and V is an institution of higher
learning. If D is delinquent on tuition payments, the school is CX.
In my view, the Bonded court missed a major point about tripartite fraudulent
transfer cases. According to this missed point, subrogation and agency doctrines
identify the child as the initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer in all cases.14
The educational institution therefore either gives clear value to the parent
(subrogation) or the parent gives the tuition to the child and subsequently, as
agent of the child, pays the child’s tuition dollars to the child’s school. In such
case, the school bestows value on the child (not the parent). If the school is in
good faith—if the school has no knowledge that the parent is insolvent—the
school has a good faith transferee defense that prevents school liability to the
parent’s bankruptcy trustee.15
This Article proposes that good faith schools are never liable for fraudulent
transfers when they accept checks from an insolvent parent of an adult student.
In pursuit of this proposition, Part I of this Article briefly states what a fraudulent

11
See Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 73 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019) (“timing is
everything”).
12
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 11 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
13
Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
14
David Gray Carlson, Mere Conduit, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 475 (2019).
15
See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019).
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transfer is, and how a bankruptcy trustee of the parent is entitled to recover it
from an initial transferee or transferee of a transferee.
Part II describes tripartite fraudulent transfer cases, where an insolvent
debtor conveys funds to a creditor or vendor of a person the debtor wishes to
enrich. It is a bizarre and indefensible aspect of the Bankruptcy Code that a good
faith initial transferee that bestows value on a third party is absolutely liable for
the fraudulent transfer. A transferee of a transferee, however, is defended by
such bestowal. The statutory wreckage, irrational and indefensible, can be
rendered harmless through the doctrines of subrogation and agency.
Part III reviews the “mere conduit” fiction employed in the Brooklyn Law
School case and finds it analytically incorrect. Schools receive tuition from the
student, even when the insolvent parent writes the tuition check. The school’s
always the transferee of a transferee.
Part IV warns that, if indeed tuition is a fraudulent transfer, and if schools
are defended as good faith bestowers of value, then the adult student has received
a fraudulent transfer by the very fact of being educated. Worse, if the adult
student is driven into bankruptcy by the bankruptcy trustee of the parent,
discharge of that obligation could be denied to the student under the recent case
of Husky International Electronics v. Ritz.16 Even if this is not the case, receipt
of a fraudulent transfer means that the student has received a “student loan,” as
the Bankruptcy Code defines that term, and student loans are not dischargeable
unless repayment constitutes an undue hardship on the student.17 Letting the
university off the hook implies that the student received the fraudulent transfer,
and for this liability there can be no bankruptcy discharge.
I. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
It is my contention that, if the underlying property regime implied by
fraudulent transfer law is carefully analyzed, schools would rarely be liable
simply because a parent paid the tuition bill of an adult child. If the school has
no knowledge of the parent’s insolvency, the school is a bona fide transferee for
value and therefore has the defense against liability spelled out in Bankruptcy
Code § 550(b)(1).18

16
17
18

Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (2016).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019).
See infra text accompanying notes 116–48.
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Fraudulent transfer law emanates from state law, but the Bankruptcy Code
also governs fraudulent transfers quite independently of state law. Furthermore,
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (enacted in most states) imports purely
federal ideas (some of which are regrettable) back into state law. Thanks to the
UFTA, serious errors of legislative judgment in the Bankruptcy Code are now
present in state law.
A. State Law
In the classic fraudulent transfer, a debtor (D) makes an absolute transfer of
property to a transferee (X) with the intent of preventing D’s creditors from
getting it. According to the time-honored phrase in the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA), inherited from the Act of Elizabeth,19 D conveys to X with
the “actual” intent to “delay, hinder or defraud creditors.”20 When this intent is
present, it doesn’t matter whether D was solvent at the time of the conveyance
or whether D received value in return. If D’s bad intent is present, D’s creditor
(CD) may obtain a remedy with regard to the very property that D conveyed to
X. Passing over the considerable controversy that exists with regard to fraudulent
transfer remedies,21 it suffices to say that CD may obtain a judicial lien on the
precise property that D has conveyed to X. At least this was how the matter stood
in Elizabethan England.
Fraudulent transfer law used to be a strictly in rem theory, with the proviso
that if X breached her fiduciary duty to preserve the property for the creditors of
D, X was guilty of the tort of conversion or breach of trust, which could generate
a money judgment.22 The UFTA adds that CD is absolutely entitled to a money
judgment “for the value of the asset transferred.”23 Thus, the UFTA, in stark
contrast to its predecessor, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),
moves fraudulent transfer from an in rem concept to an in personam tort idea.24
19

See Act Against Fraudulent Deeds, Gifts, etc. 1571, 13 Eliz. c. 5 (Eng.).
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
21
I cover these controversies in David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 165–95 (2003).
22
See Patrick J. Glackin, Note, Lease Terminations as Fraudulent Transfers: Reconciling Bankruptcy
Code Section 548 and 365(c)(3), 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2368, 2372 (2018); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 222A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay
the other the full value of the chattel.”).
23
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT § 8(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
24
This has led to the conclusion that the UFTA authorizes punitive damages against the transferor or the
transferee. Klein v. Weidner, 729 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013); SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Judkins, No. 1:17-CV00413-TH-B 5666, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5666 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2019). DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables
Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., 384 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2004) (issue certified to Indiana Supreme Court).
20
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If D has fraudulently transferred to X, X holds the property received for the
creditors of D. In addition, X has power to sell good title (free of CD) to a bona
fide transferee for value. According to UFTA § 8(a), a transfer “is not voidable
under Section 4(a)(1) against a person who took in good faith and for a
reasonably equivalent value . . . .” The defense implies that, when D conveys to
X with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud CD, X holds a voidable title to the
property conveyed.25 One may say with accuracy that X holds the conveyance
in trust for CD and the other creditors of D.26
The preceding paragraphs describe the so-called actual fraudulent transfers.
Long ago, the courts and legislators found the mental fact of intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud difficult to administer. D could usually spin a tale in which the
conveyance was motivated by some incentive other than the desire to hinder
creditors.27 Therefore, the UFCA of 1918 introduced the concept of the
“constructive” fraudulent transfer. With regard to such transfers,28 it was no
longer necessary for creditors of D to prove what D actually intended. If D was
insolvent29 (or suffered some proxy for insolvency),30 and if D transferred
property to X without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return, the
conveyance was deemed to be a fraud on creditors.31 Basically, a constructive

Classically this was unthinkable.
25
See Kenneth C. Kettering, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act; or, the 2014 Amendments to the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 70 BUS. LAW. 777, 819 (2015) (“the title received by the transferee in a
transfer voidable under the UFTA is ordinarily voidable, and [UFTA §] 8(a) can be viewed as similarly wiping
away that flaw in title if the property is taken by a good-faith purchaser for value.”).
26
E.g., Bill Voorhees Co. v. R & S Camper Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 888, 893 (5th Cir. 1979); First Natl.
Bank v. Love, 167 So. 703, 705 (Ala. 1936); Buck v. Voreis, 89 Ind. 116, 117 (Ind. 1883).
27
See Jones v. Orton (In re Orton), Case No. 3:17-bk-1242-JAF, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 904, at *6 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2018) (gift of car to daughter not an actual fraud on creditors because debtors had a moral
obligation to help their daughter). To combat these proof difficulties, courts long ago began to identify “badges
of fraud.” See Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810–11. Eleven of these badges are codified in UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
28
See generally CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 423–34 (4th ed. 1997) (“a watershed
in the evolution of fraudulent transfer law”). For the law on constructive fraudulent transfer prior to the UFCA,
see generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1608–20 (2008); John C. McCoid III, Constructively Fraudulent
Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 639, 652–56 (1983).
29
See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
30
These proxies include: (i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction for which
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) intended
to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
31
See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Codifying a Choice of Law Rule for Fraudulent Transfer: A
Memorandum to the Uniform Law Commission, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 357 (2011); Marie T. Reilly,
A Search for Reason in “Reasonably Equivalent Value” After BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (2005).
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fraudulent transfer is a “gift” by insolvent D to X. A constructive fraudulent
transfer, however, may also be an actual fraudulent transfer, where D actually
did intend to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. The two concepts potentially
overlap each other.32
Since our subject is tuition paid by D to X’s school, we shall largely confine
our discussion to constructive fraudulent transfers. We shall assume D is
insolvent at the time D pays tuition to X’s school. We shall assume that D does
not ordinarily intend to spite creditors by sending X to school.
When the operative theory is constructive fraudulent transfer (or gift), D’s
actual intent is supposedly33 irrelevant. Instead, the focus turns to whether D
received a reasonably equivalent value. This is at least what the UFTA requires.
According to UFTA § 3(a):
Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer . . . , property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or
satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made
otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor’s business to
furnish support to the debtor or another person.34

Notably, in the context of tuition, a school must show that it gave property (to
somebody) or satisfied antecedent debt (of somebody). Is education property?
The answer is decidedly yes. Education is a service delivered pursuant to a
contract in exchange for a price. A student who complies with university rules
has a property right to attend the university. Education is a “wasting asset.”35
Like good deeds, education is devoured as fast as it is made, forgot soon as
done.36

32
See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1918) (“Every conveyance made . . . with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to
hinder, delay, or defraud either present of future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.”).
33
See Jack F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied to
Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1403, 1413–14,
1424–25 (1994) (for the view that morality sneaks in through the doorway of reasonably equivalent value). See
also Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 55,
85 (1991) (“good faith in one variety or another is still very much alive in the reasonably equivalent value
determination, not as proof of the prima facie case, but as a badge of fair value.”).
34
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
35
Drewes v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.), 939 F.2d 654, 655 n.2 (8th Cir.
1991) (contracts for maintenance a “sort of wasting asset”). See Frank R. Kennedy, Reception of the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 43 S.C. L. REV. 655, 661–62 (1992).
36
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 3, sc. 3 (“Those scraps are good deeds past;
which are devour’d As fast as they are made, forgot as soon As done . . . .”).
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The issue of whether services constitute value under the UFTA has bothered
some scholars. In 1987, Professor Paul Shupack worried that the UFTA
definition of value excluded the tendering of services:
The question that the UFTA leaves unanswered is whether someone
who supplies services to the debtor in exchange for an asset gives
value. The drafters’ policy statement would suggest that, in the event
the services provided had utility for the creditors as well as the debtor,
the services should be recognized as value. The statute, however,
provides a strong counter to that argument. The statute states that for
value to be given, “property” must be transferred. If the list of
examples in the statutory language is to be read as limiting the meaning
of the word value, then the limitation implied by “property” applies to
physical or intangible items that can be transferred from one person to
another. The difficulty that the drafters have created here comes
directly from their having offered examples and a policy statement
instead of a definition for what is, after all, one of the central concepts
underlying the law of fraudulent transfer.37

If, however, we recognize that services are the proceeds of contract and that
contracts proceeds are property, this concern disappears.38 I proffer this opinion
in spite of Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), which renders nondischargeable debts
for:
money, property, services, or an extension . . . of credit to the extent
obtained by—(A) . . . actual fraud . . . .39

Here, property is contrasted with services, as if they are two different things. But
we should view services as the ghost of property past.40
One way to put this point is that value is considered from the debtor’s
standpoint, not the creditor’s.41 From the creditor’s point of view, anything a

37
Pal M. Shupack, Confusion in Policy and Language in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 811, 833 (1987).
38
Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc. 487 S.W.3d 560, 575 (Tex. 2016) (“economic benefit to the debtor does
not demand consideration that replaces the transferred property with money or something else tangible or
leviable that can be sold to satisfy the debtor’s creditors’ claims”).
39
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2019) (emphasis added).
40
According to Derek Huish: “But courts have also held that forms of recreation and entertainment that
are uncommon or wasteful, even gambling, can provide reasonably equivalent value to insolvent debtors. Most
people would find it ridiculous that a court could find that an insolvent debtor received reasonably equivalent
value through an investment in gambling but not through an investment in their own children’s education under
the same statutory provision.” Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking
to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2192 (2019).
41
Daniel Keating, Bankruptcy, Tithing, and the Pocket-Picking Paradigm of Free Exercise, 1996 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1041, 1051–52 (1996).
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vendor V conveys to D which D immediately consumes (a vacation, say, or a
restaurant meal) diminishes the debtor’s estate to the prejudice of D’s creditors.
But from the debtor’s point of view, D receives value when V bestows a vacation
or a meal on D.42 It is routinely found that V is not liable for fraudulent transfer
if V in good faith sells immediately consumed goods or services to D.43
Courts, however, sometimes insist upon the creditor’s point of view. In the
leading case of Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,44 the Court allowed
value conveyed to third parties to be counted as value to D, but “the decisions in
fact turn on the statutory purpose of conserving the debtor’s estate for the benefit
of creditors.”45 A service rendered to D by V often becomes a fraudulent transfer
under this standard.46
This controversy between the debtor’s perspective and the creditor’s
perspective is a hugely important unresolved issue in fraudulent transfer
doctrine. We shall assume, however, that the debtor’s point of view is the
appropriate standard, and that D does indeed receive value when V bestows an
instantly consumed asset (such as a service) on D.
Since education bestowed is property of X, a school has clearly given value
to X. But the Bankruptcy Code requires that value be given to D on the theory
(to be challenged here) that D directly transfers tuition money to the school.
According to § 548(c):
a transferee . . . of such a [fraudulent] transfer . . . that takes for value
and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest

42
Balabar-Strauss v. Sixty-Five Brokers (In re Churchill Mortg. Inv. Corp.), 256 B.R. 664, 681 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000).
43
Professor Zywicki also suggests that the debtor’s standpoint is justified because the transferee bestows
the service on the debtor and has relied on the consideration received to compensate for the service. Todd J.
Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Laws, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Bankruptcy Debtor’s Right to Tithe,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 1223, 1243 (1998). Reliance interest as an alternative mode of describing the bona fide
transferee defense is just another way of expressing the idea that value should be perceived from the debtor’s
point of view.
44
Rubin v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
45
Id. at 992; see also Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The primary consideration
in analyzing the exchange of value for any transfer is the degree to which the transferor’s net worth is
preserved.”).
46
DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019). Professor
Kettering remarks: “Fraudulent transfer law balances the interests of the debtor’s creditors in avoiding a transfer
against the interest of the debtor’s transferee, against whom the action lies and who bears the burden of
disgorging the transferred property or its value if the action is successful. The interest of the debtor’s transferee
surprisingly often has been forgotten in discourse on fraudulent transfer law, but to ignore that interest is an error
that invalidates the discourse.” Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 350.
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transferred . . . to the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the
debtor in exchange for such transfer . . . .47

The parallel idea in the UFTA is difficult to locate, but it is definitely there. That
value must be given to the debtor is located in UFTA § 5(a):
A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim arose before the transfer was made . . . if the debtor made the
transfer . . . without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer . . . and the debtor was insolvent at that time
or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer . . . .48

In this formulation, it is the debtor that must receive value in exchange for the
transfer. If the debtor has not received value (but some third party has), the
transferee is liable.49
That the bona fide transferee defense depends on value being bestowed on
the debtor (as opposed to a third party) is almost certainly the result of legislative
error. The UFCA protected bona fide purchasers generally, regardless of who
received the value. Thus, UFCA § 9 authorized avoidance “as against any person
except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the
time of the purchase . . . .”50 Nothing here requires that fair consideration be
received by the debtor. Since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 enacted the UFCA as
the trustee’s own right to pursue fraudulent transfers, the Bankruptcy Act also
did not require that value be received by the debtor.51 This requirement stems
from Bankruptcy Code § 548(c) and was probably introduced unintentionally.52
Nevertheless, it is now accepted that the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer
has no defense even if the transferee in good faith bestowed value on a third
party. This distinction makes vital the proper definition of “initial transferee.”

47
48
49

11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added).
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSFERS ACT § 8(b)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

2014).
50

UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS

1918).
51
Nelson Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67(c)(3), 30 Stat. 544, 564 (1898) (generally dispersed throughout Title
11). See Nat’l Bankr. Conf. Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (Comm. Print 1936) (“We have
condensed the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, retaining its substance and, as far as
possible, its language.”). The state of Washington has wisely corrected this error in its nonuniform amendment
to the UFTA. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.40.081(1) (“whether or not [the value was] given to the debtor”).
See Ralph Brubaker, On Constructively Fraudulent Transfers and Good Faith Transferees: The Case of a
Debtor-Parent’s Payment of an Adult Child’s College Tuition, 39 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, 8 (May 2019)
(discussing Washington’s amendment to the UFTA).
52
David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73, 86 (1985).
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An important question, then, is whether a benefit to X (the student) is also a
benefit to D (the parent). If D receives a reasonably equivalent value, then there
is no fraudulent transfer. Both school and student escape the wrath of the
bankruptcy courts. I shall soon problematize whether D transfers to the school
or whether D transfers to X who (through the agency of D) transfers X’s to the
school. I shall also point out that, if the school is a bona fide transferee of
services to X, then education is X’s property, and the creditors of D can recover
the value of this “property” from X.53 In short, it makes a difference whether the
student X or the school is the initial transferee of the tuition money. If all value
is received by X and none by D, then there is a fraudulent transfer and the
controversy becomes who is the proper defendant—X or the school. For the
moment, I observe that if D receives value from the school because X is
educated, then there is no fraudulent transfer in the first place. Value to D serves
to get both X and the school off the hook.54 If value is received by X alone and
not by D, then it follows that one of the defendants (X or the school) is liable to
the creditors of D.
Before we consider whether education of X (D’s adult child) bestows value
on D when D covers X’s tuition expenses, I review an analogous controversy
from twenty years ago—whether church tithing is a fraudulent transfer. In the
1990s, the vogue suddenly sprang up amongst bankruptcy trustees to recover
church tithings. Mostly trustees won these cases. Courts failed to find the
“economic” value bestowed by the church on D. In short, churchly benefit is not
the same as services rendered pursuant to a contract.55
Tithing cases differ structurally from tuition cases. Tithing cases are
bipartite. In a tithing case, D gives a charitable contribution to X Church and the
bankruptcy trustee brings suit against X Church. The issue was whether D
received “property” from the church. This proved hard to find when the church
was not contractually bound to do anything in exchange for the tithe. In contrast,
tuition cases are tripartite. In a tuition case, D pays tuition to a school to make a
gift to the adult child, X. Here, the inquiry is whether D received a reasonably
equivalent value because a third party (X) was educated.

53
In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). See Banner v. Lindsay (In re Lindsay), 2010
Bankr. LEXIS 1554, at *18–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010).
54
Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R. 444, 454–55 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011). But see Lo
v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1074–75 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (where D received value because X was educated,
X still might be liable if X received a benefit from the education).
55
Zywicki, supra note 43, at 1233–44.
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The tithing cases inspired Professor Jack Williams to suggest that implicit in
constructive fraudulent transfer doctrine is the concept of honest “ordinary
course” conduct.56 Thus, if a debtor customarily tithes, the creditors take this as
the background reality of the debtor. Creditors cannot then obtain fraudulent
transfer judgments against the churches, so long as tithing is in D’s ordinary
course of business.57 Such a view recognizes that constructive fraudulent
transfer law is an ancient proxy for specific intent to hinder creditors. That is,
the purpose of ordinary course tithing is not to hinder creditors; therefore, there
is no actual fraud and neither should there be constructive fraud, since
constructive fraud is just a proxy for actual fraud. Thus, it is silently agreed that
trustees should not seek to recover modest Christmas gifts to children, or tips in
restaurants or taxicabs, because such giving is in the ordinary course.58 Such a
notion, if tenable, would aid churches in tithing cases and schools in tuition
cases. Admittedly, the notion cannot be squared with the definition of value or
consideration, which is tied to receipt of property.59
As churches began to lose tithing cases, Congress responded with the
Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998 to shield
churches from fraudulent transfer liability. Such legislation confesses that
tithing violated the tenets of constructive fraudulent transfer law.60
As in the tithing cases, courts are quite divided over the “culturally and
socially charged issue” of whether D obtains value when her adult child X gets
educated.61
There is no division, however, when X is a minor. In such cases, courts find
not just a legal but a moral duty in D to pay the tuition bill. In Geltzer v. Xavarian
56

Williams, supra note 33, at 1414–16.
This is captured in Professor Glenn’s estimate that “the real test of a fraudulent conveyance . . . is the
unjust diminution of the debtor’s estate.” 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§ 195 at 348 (rev. ed. 1940). See Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1993). Professor Williams’
vision can be found in the legislative cure to the tithing cases. According to Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2)(A), a
tithe cannot be an actual fraudulent transfer “if the transfer was consistent with the practices of the debtor in
making charitable contributions.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (2019). On this legislative reform, see infra text
accompanying notes 77–93.
58
But see Keating, supra note 41, at 1051–52 (“the drafters of fraudulent conveyance law have drawn
the line at reasonably equivalent value received by (and from the perspective of) the debtor. This means that the
insolvent debtor is still free to engage in most transactions, except those that amount to a gift by the debtor.
Thus, though it may be small comfort to bankrupt tithers, a Mother’s Day gift given while insolvent is just as
recoverable by the trustee as a tither’s donation to a church.”).
59
Zywicki, supra note 43, at 1244–56.
60
Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1962 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at *9–
10 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018).
61
In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
57
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High School (In re Akanmu),62 the court ruled that the Ds received a direct
benefit from tuition paid for their minor children. One benefit was that the Ds
were obliged by New York law to educate their children, and actually doing so
discharged this legal obligation.63 The fact that cheaper modes of education (i.e.,
public school) were available was “irrelevant.”64 The Akanmu court feared a
slippery slope: if tuition could be recovered because it was too high and not
strictly necessary, so could any vendor of goods used by the children.65 In sum,
the Akanmu court found a confluence of interest between D and their minor
children such that D and their children “must be viewed as a single economic
unit for these purposes.”66
When X is an adult, courts are divided as to whether D has received a
reasonably equivalent value.
Some courts have declared that D does receive a reasonably equivalent value
when a school educates X. Most prominently, in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart
University, Inc. (In re Palladino),67 the court acquitted a college of fraudulent
transfer because the insolvent parent received value in return. It expressly found
that if X was rendered financially self-sufficient by education, this was an
economic benefit to D.
Often a parent will not know at the time she pays a bill, whether for
herself or for her child, if the medical procedure, the music lesson, or
the college fee will turn out to have been “worth it.” But future
outcome cannot be the standard for determining whether one receives
reasonably equivalent value at the time of a payment. A parent can
reasonably assume that paying for a child to obtain an undergraduate
degree will enhance the financial well-being of the child which in turn
will confer an economic benefit on the parent. This, it seems to me,

62

Geltzer v. Zavarian High Sch. (In re Akanmu), 502 B.R. 124 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 132; see N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3212(2)(d) (2005).
64
Geltzer, 502 B.R. at 132, 135. BAPCPA’s means testing is hard and stingy when it comes to tuition for
minors. David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: Bankruptcy’s Failed Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 223, 298 (2007). But this attitude does not spill over to fraudulent transfer litigation.
65
Geltzer, 502 B.R. at 132 (“To hold otherwise would permit a trustee to scrutinize debtors’ expenditures
for the children’s benefit, and seek to recover from the vendor if, in the trustee’s judgment, the expenditure was
not reasonably necessary, or if the good or service could have been obtained at a lower price, or at no cost,
elsewhere.”).
66
Id. at 136–37. The court goes overboard in accusing the trustee of wanting veto power over
expenditures for the family. Id. at 132. For other cases finding no fraudulent transfer in case of tuition for minors;
see McClarty v. University Liggett Sch. (In re Karolak), Case No. 12-61378, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3694, at *3–
9 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013); In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
67
DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart Univ., Inc. (In re Palladino), 556 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016), rev’d,
942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019).
63
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constitutes a quid pro quo that is reasonable and reasonable
equivalence is all that is required.68

Channeling Professor Williams’s point, the court in Shearer v. Oberdick (In re
Oberdick)69 found no fraudulent transfer: “there is something of a societal
expectation that parents will assist with such expense if they are able to do so.”70
A slight majority of courts, however, finds that the parent receives no value
when an adult child is educated.71 Just before press time, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, reversing in DeGiacomo v. Sacred Heart University, Inc., (In re
Palladino),72 ruled that “the answer is straightforward. The tuition payments
here depleted the estate and furnished nothing of direct value to the creditors
who are the central concern of [§ 548(a)].”73
In Gold v. Marquette University (In re Leonard),74 the school claimed D
received peace of mind because X would have the opportunities in life that a
68
Id. at 15. In Palladino, D used Ponzi funds to pay tuition. Ponzi funds can be viewed as being held in
constructive trust for the dupes and victims of the scheme. Thus, it is tempting to think that there were no
fraudulent transfers in the case. Rather, the university simply received trust funds of some identifiable victim.
But, as a bona fide purchaser of trust funds, the university took them free and clear of the rights of the victims
and, in any case, the bankruptcy trustee has no right to enforce the beneficial interest of constructive trust on
behalf of the victims. Id. at 14–15. On this issue, see David Gray Carlson, Fraudulent Transfers and Constructive
Trusts: When Worlds Collide, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 365 (2020). The Palladino court also refused to use the Ponzi
presumption that any payment made to further the scheme is an intentional (not constructive) fraudulent transfer.
In re Palladino, 556 B.R. at 13–14.
69
Shearer v. Oberdick (In re Oberdick), 490 B.R. 687 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2013).
70
Id. at 712. See Lo v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). The Oberdick case is bizarre. It
involves a deposit account with a bank that was held in tenancy by the entirety under Pennsylvania law. In
Pennsylvania, the marital entity is considered a separate legal entity from either husband or wife. The theory of
the case was that D (husband) deposited wages in the deposit account. Under Pennsylvania law, ninety percent
of wages are exempt from garnishment. Nevertheless, 100% of the deposits were held to be fraudulent transfers
from D to the marital entity. D and his spouse (W) made many prepetition withdrawals. This made D and W
transferees of a transferee. D had a bankruptcy discharge, which should have terminated D’s liability for
receiving and dissipating marital entity funds. The discharge was held not to apply on inscrutable reasoning.
Then, out of nowhere, D and W were accorded a defense if the funds they received from the marital entity were
used on necessities, as opposed to luxuries. Such a defense has no relation to any fraudulent transfer I am familiar
with. It was in the context of the “necessities defense” the court made its observation about college education.
Thus, rather than ruling that the parents received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for tuition, the court
was really ruling that college education is not a luxury. Finally, the court identifies some luxury spending, but it
allowed these amounts to be offset by “necessities” spending. Thus, D and W escaped liability altogether, even
though they spent some prepetition dollars on luxuries. Oberdick, 490 B.R. at 698–714. “Necessities” may refer
to the fact that wages are ninety percent exempt, except to the extent the wages are not necessary for upkeep.
See generally Shearer v. Titus (In re Titus), 916 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2019).
71
Huish, supra note 2, at 2184; Gold v. Marquette Univ. (In re Leonard), 454 B.R. 444 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2011).
72
In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55.
73
Id. at *6–*7.
74
In re Leonard, 454 B.R. 444.
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college education supposedly represents. Noting that the definition of value
requires D to receive property or satisfaction of antecedent debt, the court
allowed that receipt of value might be indirect—channeled from the school to X
to D, like a bank shot in a game of pool.75 But the value D received must be “(1)
an ‘economic’ benefit; (2) concrete; and (3) quantifiable.”76 Since D had no legal
obligation to support X, D received no “value.” Peace of mind and moral
obligation cut no ice.77 On the other hand, the court chastised the school for not
even trying to quantify these values, leaving open the possibility that if
quantification could be achieved, these indirect benefits might be value after
all.78
B. Legislative Reform
The vogue of suing universities for tuition has been compared with the fad
of suing churches for tithings in the 1990s.79 Mostly the churches lost. As a
result, Congress enacted legislation to prevent suits in bankruptcy for
constructive fraudulent transfers for charitable contributions for amounts not
exceeding “15 percent of the gross annual income for the year in which the
transfer of the contribution is made . . . .”80 For actual fraud cases, no law suits
for amounts less than the same fifteen percent can be sustained “if the transfer
was consistent with the practices of the debtor in making charitable
contributions.”81 Meanwhile, § 544(b)(2) prevents the trustee from subrogating
to the state law rights of a creditor against a charity tied to the same fifteen

75
See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1981) (“the
transaction’s benefit to the debtor ‘need not be direct; it may come indirectly through benefit to a third
person . . . . If the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in the debtor’s hands, or if the
giving of the consideration to the third person otherwise confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then the
debtor’s net worth has been preserved . . . .”).
76
In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 457 (citing Lisle v. John Wiley & Sons., Inc. (In re Wilkinson, 196 F. App’x
337, 342 (6th Cir. 2006)).
77
See Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1962 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at
*8–10 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018). See also In re Sterman, 594 B.R. 229, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); Boscarino
v. Bd. of Trs. of Conn. State Univer. Sys. (In re Knight), Case No. 15-21646 (JJT) 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3324, at
*11 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2017); Roach v. Skidmore Coll. (In re Dunston), 566 B.R. 624, 636–37 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 2017).
78
In re Leonard, 454 B.R. at 459. But see Slobodian v. Pa. State Univ. (In re Fisher), 575 B.R. 640, 647
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2017) (trustee’s complaint survived Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because D had the burden to prove
that D actually realized intangible value in exchange for tuition payments). The court deemed it necessary to
find out if X has graduated and is gainfully employed. Thus, a bad choice of major might render the tuition
payment a fraudulent transfer.
79
See supra text accompanying notes 55–60.
80
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (2019).
81
§ 548(a)(2)(B).
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percent limit.82 This section concludes with a remarkable sentence: “Any claim
by any person to recover a transferred contribution described in the preceding
sentence under Federal or State law in a Federal or State court shall be preempted
by the commencement of the case.”83 Thus, a creditor might sue a church under
state law, but if the debtor files for bankruptcy, the creditor’s suit is
“preempted”—presumably it disappears.84
Some have called for parallel legislation to protect universities from
fraudulent transfer liability.85 Such calls confess that universities are indeed at
risk, which the current article denies.
At least one state (Connecticut) has enacted a non-uniform amendment to
the UFTA. According to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i:
A transfer or obligation is not voidable under subdivision (2) of
subsection (a) of section 52-552e or section 52-552f against an
institution of higher education, as defined in 20 U.S.C. 1001, if the
transfer was made or obligation incurred by a parent or guardian on
behalf of a minor or adult child in furtherance of the child’s
undergraduate education.86

Conn. Gen. Stat §§ 52-552e(a)(2) and 52-552f refer to constructive fraudulent
transfers. Thus, it is still possible to sue a school for receipt of an actual
fraudulent transfer. The statute neglects to protect graduate institutions for
tuition received.
The Connecticut reform so far stands alone, and it raises choice of law
predicaments in tuition cases.

82

See Kettering, UVTA, supra note 25, at 784. On state reforms, see id. at 785–90.
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(2) (2019).
84
For criticism of these amendments on technical grounds, see Steven Walt, Generosity in Bankruptcy:
The New Place of Charitable Contributions in Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1029 (1999).
85
Alexis Gebhardt, Comment, Closing the Loophole: Bankruptcy Trustees Attempt to Claw Back Tuition
Payments from Colleges and Universities, 3 BUS. & BANKR. L.J. 319, 339–46 (2016); Jenna C. MacDonald,
Comment, Out of Reach: Protecting Parental Contributions to Higher Education from Clawback in Bankruptcy,
34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 243, 245–46 (2017); Andrew Mackenzie, Note, The Tuition Claw Back Phenomenon:
Reasonably Equivalent Value and Parental Tuition Payments, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 924, 949–52 (2016).
Derek Huish presents a nuanced reform that would protect undergraduate institutions from liability when it
receives a payment more than one year before the parents’ bankruptcy or (if “such transfer was consistent with
the practices of the debtor”) more than six months before bankruptcy. Derek A. Huish, Note, Clawing Back
Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking to Ancient and Recent History to Define the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV.
2151, 2198 (2019).
86
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i(f) (2017).
83
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Choice of law as applied to fraudulent transfers is an obscure topic that has,
happily, been thoroughly reviewed by Professor Kenneth C. Kettering.87
Professor Kettering reminds us that the First Restatement of Conflicts of Laws
favored the now-discredited “situs” test.88 Under this test, where the parent pays
for tuition by check, the situs would be where the parent’s bank is located. A
school will receive the check in the mail, will deposit the check at its local bank,
which will send the check through a clearing system. Eventually, the parent’s
bank honors the check, usually by crediting the account of the presenting bank,
which eventually results in the school’s bank giving the school a right of
withdrawal from the school’s deposit account.
Since the First Restatement, a “revolution in American choice of law
thinking” has swept away the situs test.89 The Second Restatement, considering
real property cases, is mealy-mouthed about the situs test which “usually
applies” but “on occasion” may not.90 It says nothing at all about personal
property cases. As to real property cases, the Second Restatement points to the
methodology appropriate to torts, which basically bids a court to find somehow
which state has the most significant relationship with the occurrence of the tort.
Finding such standards unsatisfactory, Professor Kettering suggests that the
parent’s domicile should be the rule in constructive fraudulent transfer cases and
also in actual fraud cases involving transfers for less than reasonably equivalent
value.91 This rule, borrowed from Article 9 for hypothecations,92 has found its
way into the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA),93 the latest version
of a uniform fraudulent transfer law. The UVTA has been enacted in several
states, but not yet in Connecticut.
87

Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 357.
Id. at 339 (“The First Restatement, issued in 1934, sets forth a simple sharp-edged rule: fraudulent
transfer law is determined by the situs at the time of the challenged transfer.”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 341 (discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CHOICE OF LAW § 145).
91
Id. at 357–58. His suggested rule thus lines up with the basic choice-of-law rule in Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1) (“while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction,
the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of a
[possessory] security interest in that collateral”). Recall that Article 9 is basically fraudulent transfer legislation,
legalizing hypothecations that otherwise would have been struck down by Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep.
809, 810–11. See G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 3, 6–9 (2001).
92
U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a
jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and
the priority of a security interest in collateral”). In the case of pledges, the law where collateral is located is the
choice of law. Id. § 9-301(3).
93
UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSFERS ACT § 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). See Kettering, supra note 25, at
796–98.
88
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If such a rule were to be applied,94 Connecticut’s statute would protect
universities worldwide where the parent lives in Connecticut. On the other hand,
Connecticut universities gain no succor where they accept tuition from nonConnecticut parents.
Such a choice-of-law rule indicates that Connecticut’s reform will have only
spotty application, guaranteeing Connecticut schools protection only when the
parent resides in Connecticut.95 This bleak assessment of the impact of state
legislation, coupled with the well-known paralysis in the United States
Congress, should motivate finding ways to protect schools from fraudulent
transfer liability from within the resources of existing doctrine. I maintain that
these resources are available.
C. Federal Bankruptcy Law
So far, we have treated the tuition question as a matter of state law. In fact,
tuition litigation most often occurs within the context of bankruptcy litigation.
Since the invention of bankruptcy, creditor representatives have been endowed
with the power to collect fraudulent transfers made to third parties.96
In modern times, a bankruptcy trustee has two different theories to recover
a fraudulent transfer. First, the trustee has direct standing to recover fraudulent
transfers under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a). Second, under § 544(b), the trustee
can assert the rights of an actual creditor who has avoidance rights under state
law.97 The principal difference between the two provisions is the statute of
limitations. Under § 548(a), a bankruptcy trustee has a two-year look-back
period. Under § 544(b), where the trustee invokes the avoidance rights of some
real-life creditor, the trustee is subject to a longer statute of limitations. Under
the UFTA, the statute of limitations is four years.98 In New York, the statute of
limitations is six years.99
94
Although Professor Kettering offers his proposal for legislative reform, he remarks: “There is little or
nothing to prevent a court from following the approach to choice of law for fraudulent transfer set forth in this
paper, if the court finds it sensible. Indeed, there are few subjects on which judges have been more receptive to
suggestions from the academic community than choice of law.” Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31 at 359.
95
Chorches v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No. 3:16-cv-1964 (MPS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116919, at *20–
27 (D. Conn. July 13, 2018) (declining to give Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552i retroactive effect).
96
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 541 (1994); Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent
Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 541–44 (1987).
97
In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98, 113 (2d Cir. 2016) (section 544(b)
permits a trustee to “step into the shoes of a creditor under state law and avoid any transfers such a creditor could
have avoided.”) (quoting Univ. Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 222 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)).
98
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
99
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (MCKINNEY 2019); In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 773 F.3d 411, 416
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State law presents a trap for bankruptcy trustees. The UFCA and the UFTA
distinguish between future and present creditors. If the trustee relies on
insolvency of D (and not one of the insolvency proxies), the trustee must locate
someone who was a “present” creditor at the time the tuition payment was
made.100 Suppose D is bankrupt in 2019 and six years is the relevant statute of
limitations. The bankruptcy trustee can recover two years of tuition under
§ 548(a)(1)(B) without any reference to state law. But under state law, the trustee
will have to locate someone who was a creditor in 2013 to capture tuition in the
years 2013-16. If such a creditor cannot be located, the trustee can still recover
if the trustee locates a creditor who was still a future creditor as of 2013. But this
requires more than D’s insolvency. The trustee must also prove that, in the years
2013-16, D:
(i) [W]as engaged or was about to engage in a business or
transaction for which remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability
to pay as they became due.101

Thus, a creditor whose claim arose in 2018 might be invoked, but the burden of
proof on the trustee extends beyond a showing of balance-sheet insolvency in
2013.102
The Bankruptcy Code supplements avoidance, as that concept is invoked in
§ 548(a) and § 544(b). According to § 550(a):
[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544 . . . [or]
548 . . . the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such
property, from—
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.103

(2d Cir. 2014).
100
See Alan N. Resnick, Finding the Shoes that Fit: How Derivative is the Trustee’s Power to Avoid
Fraudulent Conveyances under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 205, 210 (2009).
This distinction between present and future creditors in fraudulent transfer cases relates back to Reade v.
Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N.Y. Ch. 1818) (Kent, C.).
101
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984).
102
Resnick, supra note 100, at 212.
103
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2019).
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This section uses the word “recover,” which is undefined. I take this to be
repeating the word “avoid,”104 as used in §§ 544(b) and 548(a). “Recover” adds
nothing, if I am right.105
Section 550(a) does add the idea of money judgments against X, “if the court
so orders.” Such an idea is implicit in the idea of avoidance. If X (our fraudulent
donee) sells the personal property received instead of holding in trust for D’s
creditors, X is guilty of the tort of conversion. X has converted the property to
her own use and must pay the value of the thing converted at the time of
conversion.106 The reference in § 550(a) to money judgments reiterates this idea.
Most of our difficulties stem from a distinction introduced by § 550(a)—a
distinction between the initial transferee and a transferee of a transferee. In the
context of fraudulent transfers, the only chance for an initial transferee to defend
(putting aside the statute of limitations) is giving value to the debtor under
§ 548(c). Where, however, the theory of avoidance is that an insolvent D made
a gratuitous transfer, this defense will not avail the initial transferee. According
to § 548(c):
[A] transferee . . . of such a [fraudulent] transfer . . . that takes for
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest
transferred . . . to the extent that such transferee . . . gave value to the
debtor in exchange for such transfer . . . .107

In our paradigm case, D pays tuition to a school for X’s education. Since X gets
the value (education) and (ex hypothesi) D does not get value, the school has no
defense under § 548(c). If a good faith university is deemed an initial transferee,
the university is bereft of a defense.108
A transferee of a transferee, however, has a different defense, as we have
seen.109 According to § 550(b):
104
See Begier v. United States, 496 U.S. 53, 55 (1990) (“This case presents the question whether a trustee
in bankruptcy may ‘avoid’ (i.e., recover) . . . payments . . . .”).
105
But see Suhar v. Burns (In re Burns), 322 F.3d 421, 425–29 (6th Cir. 2003). According to the Sixth
Circuit, “recovery” is necessary when, at the time of D’s bankruptcy petition, D was out of possession. Thus,
recovery is redundant of the turnover provision. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2019). In my view, recovery is redundant
of avoidance itself.
106
“Conversion” is a personal property concept. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1965) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full
value of the chattel.”). Courts are quite willing to issue money judgments for the fraudulent transfer of real
property as well. James v. Powell, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10, 24–25 (N.Y. 1967).
107
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019) (emphasis added).
108
Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019).
109
See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
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The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section
from—(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or
securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided . . . .110

By the reference to § 550(a)(2), § 550(b) indicates that initial transferees may
not assert this defense.111 This defense differs from that to be found in § 548(c).
Whereas § 548(c) requires good faith value to the debtor, § 550(b) permits good
faith value to nondebtors.
As a result, in the case of gratuitous transfers, it matters a great deal whether
we proclaim the defendant to be the initial transferee or the transferee of a
transferee. If the school is an initial transferee who has in good faith given value
to X, such value cannot defend the school. But if the school is the transferee of
a transferee, good faith value extended to X (education) has defensive bite on
behalf of the school.
Section 550(a)(1) gives the trustee the additional option of recovering from
the “entity for whose benefit” the initial transfer was made.112 This concept,
however, is not relevant in tuition cases. X is clearly benefited when D pays the
tuition bill, but X also receives the proceeds of the tuition. X is therefore a
transferee of a transferee (if the school is conceived as the initial transferee of
tuition dollars). The seminal case on tripartite fraudulent transfers, Bonded
Financial Services v. European American Bank,113 holds that a transferee of a
transferee under § 550(a)(2) can never be a “person benefited” under
§ 550(a)(1).114 A transferee of a transferee is entitled to the bona fide transfer
defense under § 550(b)(1) and a “person benefited” under § 550(a)(1) is not.
Judge Easterbrook, in Bonded, reasoned a transferee of a transferee ought not to
be deprived of the bona fide transfer defense by recharacterizing the remote
transferee as a person benefited by the initial transfer.115 Accordingly, either X
is the initial transferee or X is the transferee of a transferee, but X is never a
person benefitted when D pays X’s tuition bill. Bizarrely, the law implies that

110

11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2019).
Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Servs. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2002); Shafer v.
Las Vegas Hilton Corp. (In re Video Depot), 127 F.3d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1997); Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d
936, 938, 944 (10th Cir. 1996); Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway (In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship), 99 F.3d
151, 154 (4th Cir. 1996).
112
Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14, at 525–26 (analyzing the meaning of “benefit”).
113
Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
114
Id. at 896.
115
Id.
111
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education never “benefits” X. It is only transferred to X in a billiards-style bank
shot.
II. TRIPARTITE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
A great many fraudulent transfer cases are tripartite. In these cases, insolvent
D pays CX, a creditor of X, where X is a friend, relative or insider of D. Because
D’s check is made payable to CX, courts wrongly perceive CX as the initial
transferee of a fraudulent transfer made for the benefit of X.116 As the initial
transferee, CX’s only chance to defend is that CX in good faith conveyed value to
D (rather than to X). Courts usually think this cannot be shown.
CX, however, can easily show that D’s check to CX bestowed value upon X.
If X were the initial transferee and if CX were X’s transferee, CX would be a
transferee of a transferee under § 550(a)(2). Such a transfer once removed from
D is entitled to the defense of § 550(b)(1). That defense requires CX to be a good
faith transferee, and it expressly includes “tak[ing] for value, including
satisfaction or securing of a present of antecedent debt . . . .”117 It does not
require that the value be given to D, as § 548(c) does.
A. Subrogation
Courts assume that when D writes a check to CX, CX is the initial transferee
of a fraudulent transfer. What courts forget is that when D sends funds to CX, D
is subrogated to CX’s rights against X. Where X is solvent, this subrogation right
is a dollar-for-dollar equivalent exchange.118 Accordingly, D receives value
within the meaning of § 548(c).119
The mechanics of subrogation is most easily seen if we translate the matter
to the environment of negotiable instruments. Suppose X has borrowed $100
from CX and has signed a promissory note for this debt. At the time of the loan
assume X is solvent. D then pays CX $100 for the note and CX surrenders the note
116

Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14.
11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (2019).
118
In re Ollag Construction Equip. Corp., 578 F.2d 904, 908–09 (2d Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Comm’r, 560
F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1977); Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial
Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 655, 679 (1983); Phillip I. Blumberg, Intragroup (Upstream, Cross-Stream, and
Downstream) Guaranties under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 699–700 (1987);
Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J.109, 113 (1986);
William H. Coquillette, Guaranty of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary
Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. R 433, 456–57 (1980).
119
See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984), 7A U.L.A. 644, 645
(1985) (stating that the debtor assets include the “contingent claim of a surety for . . . subrogation”).
117
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to D. Assume at the time of this exchange, D is insolvent. It is erroneous to think
that CX has been paid and that X is now debt-free. Rather, D has bought the
promissory note and may now enforce the note against X. This is precisely how
subrogation works.
Because of subrogation, CX has made a contemporaneous exchange with D.
D paid $100 to CX and in exchange has received rights against X. Since X is
solvent and can pay, D has received full value from CX. The exchange is not a
fraudulent transfer.
Suppose further that, later, D realizes that if D recovers from X, the proceeds
will only enrich D’s creditors. Therefore, in an effort to enrich X, D rips up the
note, waives her rights and renders X debt-free. Forgiveness of debt is a
transfer120 and, if X gave nothing in return for debt forgiveness, forgiveness is a
fraudulent transfer. Accordingly, D’s bankruptcy trustee can recover $100 from
X, who is the initial transferee of the debt cancellation. The trustee can recover
nothing from CX.
Typically, a school, like any rational vendor, wants tuition payments up
front, before the education of X actually commences.121 The school is typically
not a creditor of X. But subrogation can (uneasily) be made to fit the tuition
puzzle. In the subrogation model, D (the parent) buys the education. Then the
parent doles out the education to the child. Every time X obtains a unit of
education from the school, D is surrendering an asset to X without receiving a
reasonably equivalent value in return. In this vision, D owns the education and
doles it out to X.
There are several things wrong with the subrogation picture as applied to
tuition cases. First, D does not deliver lectures to X, nor does D grade X’s papers
or bestow a diploma on X. The school does all these things—though it arguably
does so as agent of D.
A second possible objection is that the school admitted the child, not the
parent. If the parent shows up at school and demands to be educated, the school
is within its rights to call security to have the parent escorted off campus,
because the admission was granted to the adult child alone.
120
Grochocinsky v. Reliant Interactive Media Corp. (In re General Search.com), 322 B.R. 836, 842–43
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co., 37 Cal. App. 5th 894, 904–05 (Cal. App. 2019); cf.
Patrick J. Glackin, Note, Lease Terminations as Fraudulent Transfers: Reconciling Bankruptcy Code Section
548 and 365(c)(3), 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2368, 2386–89 (2018) (lease cancellations are transfers).
121
Pergament v. Hofstra Univ. (In re Adamo), 582 B.R. 267, 269–72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d,
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (college sued for $121,388).
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A third observation suggests subrogation is the wrong concept. Suppose the
parent D and the child X have a falling out. D then forbids X from attending
school out of spite. The school will undoubtedly conclude that X has bought the
education because the tuition bill was paid. Most schools, I think, educate X over
the opposition of D (where X is an adult).122
A fourth objection is that subrogation creates reasonably equivalent value
for D when X is solvent. But where X is insolvent, the value of D’s asset must
be discounted. College students are usually insolvent. Therefore, the school does
not give full value when it sells X’s education to the parent D. Subrogation will
usually yield only a partial defense to a university.
These observations militate against applying the subrogation model.
Although subrogation describes transfers to CX (creditor of X), the concept ill
fits the tuition cases.
B. Agency
There is an alternative way to analyze simple tripartite cases where CX is the
creditor of X and D wishes to enrich X by retiring CX’s claim against X. The
extinguishment of CX’s claim requires that X tender payment to CX. Under our
scenario, D tenders D’s own dollars to X. According to the law of payment, D’s
tender means precisely what D intends it to mean.123 D’s intent is that the dollars
are to extinguish X’s claim. CX cannot accept D’s dollars for any other purpose.
CX cannot say, “I treat this as a gift from D to me personally,” while maintaining,
on the side, “I shall bring an action against X to compel X to pay X’s debt, since
that debt is outstanding.” The meaning of D’s tender is that X’s debt is
extinguished. CX is stuck with that meaning.124
Being a creditor means that CX is required to accept tender of money from X
to extinguish the debt. A corollary is that CX is not required to accept money
from a stranger to pay (or buy) X’s debt. CX can refuse D’s tender and insist that
X pay CX. D, however, can claim to be the agent of X and can claim that D’s
dollars are actually X’s dollars. In that case, if D really is the agent of X, CX is
obligated to accept D’s tender, because D is tendering X’s dollars. And if X
agrees that CX’s claim against X is extinguished, X must have ratified D’s acts
as being authorized. This necessarily entails that D first gave dollars to X as
initial transferee. Only thereafter did X (through the agency of D) tender dollars
122

In re Adamo, 582 B.R. at 275.
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 388–89 (Walter H.E. Yaeger ed., 3rd.
ed. 1972).
124
Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Assocs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
123
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to CX. This makes CX a transferee of a transferee. As such CX’s claim against X
is value given to X and CX is defended under § 550(b)(1).
As applied to tuition, once D pays it, the school is obliged to educate X, even
over the subsequent opposition of D. This implies that D made a final and
irrevocable gift of tuition dollars to X and (as X’s agent) D conveyed X’s dollars
to the school in payment of tuition. X is thus the initial transferee and the school
is the transferee of a transferee.
On this model, suppose the student changes her mind and decides not to go
to school. Under the policy of reputable schools, a refund of tuition dollars will
be offered.125 If the refund belongs to X, then it must be the case that D first
gifted X with the dollars and then (as X’s agent) bought X the education with X’s
funds. For this reason, X owns the refund. If the refund belongs to D, then it also
follows that D may prevent X from attending school, thereby generating the
refund. The school may take the position that, where X wants to continue the
education, X may attend school over the opposition of D and D is not entitled to
the refund. This is good evidence that X was the initial transferee of the tuition
dollars and that the school is a transferee from X—a transferee of a transferee
entitled to the § 550(b)(1) defense.
A proof exists to show that X is the initial transferee and the school is the
remote transferee. The proof comes from voidable preference law and, more
specifically, from the “earmarking doctrine” that has been developed to defend
refinancing of debt.
Very briefly, Bankruptcy Code § 547(b) makes voidable transfers to
unsecured creditors shortly before bankruptcy. Suppose D owes C1 on an
unsecured debt. The day before bankruptcy, D wires funds to C1. The trustee
may avoid this payment, forcing C1 to disgorge.126 C1 may then enter the
bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor.127
Suppose, however, D refinances the debt to C1 by borrowing on an unsecured
basis from C2. D promises to repay C2 and, on the day before bankruptcy, C2
wires the loan proceeds directly to C1. Courts long ago observed that this
transaction has no deleterious effect on the size of D’s bankruptcy estate or on
the equal distribution of the estate to D’s unsecured creditors. In effect, all that
we observe is that the identity of one of the unsecured creditors has changed.
125
Pergament, 595 B.R. at 11; Mangan v. Univ. of Conn. (In re Hamadi), 597 B.R. 67, 70–71 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2019).
126
11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b), 550(a)(1) (2019).
127
11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2019).
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Two days before bankruptcy, C1 was a creditor. On the day of bankruptcy, C1 is
not a creditor. C2 has taken the place of C1, and the amount available to distribute
to the unsecured creditors remains unchanged.128
The way courts describe this result is to say that C1 never received debtor
property.129 Rather C1 received C2’s property. The reason why the loan proceeds
are not D’s property is that D never controlled the loan proceeds. The wire went
directly from C2 to C1.
The claim is patently absurd. D requested the loan and instructed C2 where
to send the proceeds. Obviously, D controlled the entire transaction. Nobody
forced D to refinance.
So far, earmarking is to the detriment of the universities. Just as C2’s wire to
C1 was (supposedly) a transfer of C2’s property to C1, so D’s tuition check to the
university is D’s funds, not X’s funds.
The proof emanates from the cases in which D uses a secured refinancing to
retire unsecured debt. Suppose D grants a recorded mortgage to C2 and instructs
D to wire the loan proceeds to C1. D and C2 have exchanged real estate for
money. This exchange is not preferential.130 Then D directs C2 to wire loan
proceeds to C1. C2 does so as agent of D, transferring D’s dollars to C1. This
tripartite transaction depletes the bankruptcy estate and so C1 is guilty of
voidable preference. In analyzing these cases, courts simply forget the premises
of earmarking. In the earmarking cases, C2’s wire to C1 conveyed C2’s property,
not D’s property.131 In secured refinancing, however, C2 is deemed to convey
D’s property to C1.132
The secured refinancing cases prove that universities are not the initial
transferees of tuition payments. In this latter line of cases, the proceeds of C2’s
loan are D’s property. We see a wire from C2 to C1, but C1 is not the initial
transferee of C2’s property. Conceptually, the transaction is triangular. C2
endows D and it is D (via the agency of C2) that conveys to C1.
128

Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 97 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1996).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (preamble) (“the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property . . . .”); In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1538 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992);
Mandross v. Peoples Banking Co. (In re Hartley), 825 F.2d 1067, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987).
130
Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443 (1917). In Dean, the Court struck down the mortgage as a fraudulent
conveyance, since C2 knew D would soon be bankrupt. In effect, D intended to hinder his other unsecured
creditors when he granted the mortgage to C2.
131
In re Kelton Motors, Inc., 97 F.3d at 28.
132
David Gray Carlson & William H. Widen, The Earmarking Defense to Voidable Preference Liability:
A Reconceptualization, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 595–99 (1999).
129
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The tuition cases are similarly triangular. In the tuition cases, we witness a
check from D go to the university, but the school is not the initial transferee of
D’s property. Rather, D enriches X, then X pays the school through the agency
of D.133
The secured refinancing cases turn on making the C2-to-C1 payment into a
triangle. These cases prove that the D-to-school cases are also triangular.
C. Tuition Funded by Loans to the Parent
Under the Higher Education Act of 1965,134 the Department of Education
(DOE) will lend funds for tuition to the parents of a student to fund the student’s
education, but the DOE insists on transferring the loan proceeds directly to the
university.135
A few cases have ruled that the university receiving these funds has never
received debtor property. Consequently, the university is not the recipient of a
fraudulent transfer from the insolvent parent.136 In Eisenberg v. Pennsylvania
State University (In re Lewis),137 the court remarked:
[T]he proceeds from the Parent PLUS loans were never [D’s] property,
were never in his possession or control, and were never remotely
available to pay [D’s] creditors. As a result, the [DOE’s] payment of
the Parent PLUS loan proceeds to Penn State did not diminish [D’s]
bankruptcy estate and avoidance of these transfers would be improper
and unwarranted.138

That the university prevails is consistent with the normative thrust of this Article.
But the rationale of Lewis is in fact catastrophic. The idea is that D can borrow
and divert the loan proceeds to X. X has received a gift from insolvent D but is
immune from fraudulent transfer liability because X took lender money, not D’s
133
Distressingly few tripartite fraudulent transfer cases are willing to find a triangle from D to X to CX,
but they do exist. See First Independence Capital Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re First
Independence Capital Corp.), 181 Fed. Appx. 525, 527–28 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Auto-Pak, Inc., 73 B.R. 52, 55
(D.D.C. 1987); Meoli v. Huntington Natl. Bank (In re Teleservices Croup, Inc.), 444 B.R. 767, 793–95 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 2011); In re Concord Sr. Housing Foundation, 94 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988). For antitriangle cases see Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway (In re Southeast Hotel Props. Ltd. Partnership), 99 F.3d
151, 156 (4th Cir. 1996); see Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn Mitchell Inc.), 164 B.R. 117, 124–28
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994). See also Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14.
134
20 U.S.C. § 1001 (2019).
135
§ 1087(b).
136
See Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro), 586 B.R. 379, 380–81, 387–88 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2018); Novak v. Univ. of Miami (In re Demitrus), 586 B.R. 88, 92–93 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2018).
137
See Eisenberg v. Pa. State Univ. (In re Lewis), 574 B.R. 536, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2017).
138
Id. at 539.
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money. Such a premise not only privileges X, who is enriched because D
obtained the loan, but it makes the lender absolutely liable for having made the
loan. D’s incurrence of an obligation, it seems, can be a fraudulent transfer.
Suitably redacted, Bankruptcy Code § 548(a) provides:
(1) The trustee may avoid any . . . obligation . . . incurred by the
debtor, that was . . . incurred on or within 2 years before the date
of the filing of the petition, if the debtor . . . (B)(i) received less
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such . . . obligation; and (ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that
such . . . obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result
of such . . . obligation . . . .139

Suppose the lender is unaware that D was insolvent. One would expect that the
lender is a good faith purchaser of its claim because it tendered consideration to
D. According to § 548(c), an “obligee of such [an] . . . obligation . . . may
enforce any obligation incurred . . . to the extent such . . . obligee gave value to
the debtor in exchange for such . . . obligation.”140 But if the lender has tendered
the loan proceeds to X, not to D, then the lender never qualifies for the § 548(c)
defense.
In Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro),141 the court ruled
that the university had not received a fraudulent transfer because it received
DOE funds, not debtor funds.142 In so ruling, the court imagined that it was
protecting the integrity of the Higher Education Act:
A conclusion that the Direct PLUS Loan proceeds are property of the
debtor for purposes of §§ 544 and 548 and therefore available for
distribution to a debtor’s creditors would undermine the purposes of
the HEA and disregard the parent-debtor’s lack of possession and
control over the Direct PLUS Loan proceeds.143

In fact, the effect of the ruling was to shift liability from the university back to
the DOE for sending loan proceeds to a third party instead of to the debtor.
Worse, the rationale deprives the DOE of a bona fide transferee defense under
§ 548(c).144
139

11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2019).
§ 548(c) (emphasis added).
141
Roumeliotis v. Johnson & Wales Univ. (In re Demauro), 586 B.R. 379, 380–81, 387–88 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 2018).
142
Id. at 386.
143
Id.
144
The DOE can be compared to the financing lender of a leveraged buyout, where the lender knows that
the loan proceeds are not to be retained by the borrower but are to be “upstreamed” to the departing shareholders.
140
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The concept of “control” as the hallmark of debtor property is borrowed
from the earmarking doctrine in voidable preference law, described above.145
D’s lack of control explains why C1 is not preferred when an unsecured
refinancing C2 advances funds to C1. The concept stems from pre-Code days,
when the voidable preference statute was poorly written, and courts had to
cobble together legal fictions to make the statute work.146 The Bankruptcy Code
adds a “contemporaneous exchange” defense in § 547(c)(1).147 According to this
defense, if C1 has received debtor funds on antecedent debt and it was intended
to be contemporaneous with C2 (advancing funds on an unsecured basis), then
the transfer cannot recover the payment to C1.148 The criterion of control is
therefore outmoded in the environment of voidable preference law and should
be retired. It definitely should not be exported to fraudulent transfer law.
In any case, this rationale that the university never received the debtor’s
property contradicts the classic holding of Dean v. Davis.149 In Dean, a lender
(X) lent money to D but sent the cash directly to D’s unsecured creditor, C. The
Court refers to C as being preferred, and X’s mortgage on D’s property was held
a fraudulent transfer because the lender knew that D’s use of the loan proceeds
to pay C was a voidable preference. Thus, the Supreme Court viewed the loan
proceeds (forwarded to C) as D’s property, since it recognized that C had been
preferred.150 A preference to C implies C received debtor property, not lender
property.
Similarly, when a parent D borrows from the DOE and the DOE sends funds
directly to the university, the university is receiving D’s property. The DOE is
lending to D and, as agent of D, forwards the proceeds to the university. When
D borrows cash from the DOE, D is exchanging a promise to repay. D “controls”
the transaction because D voluntarily promises to repay. The promise enriches
the university when the DOE wires the funds directly to the university.
Effectively, the DOE puts D into funds and D then puts the university into the

Ralph Brubaker, On Constructively Fraudulent Transfers and Good Faith Transferees: The Case of a DebtorParent’s Payment of an Adult Child’s College Tuition, 39 Bankr. L. Letter 1, 11–12 (May 2019).
145
See id. at 11.
146
Carlson & Widen, supra note 132, at 607–12.
147
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (2019).
148
Carlson & Widen, supra note 132, at 592.
149
See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 443–45 (1917).
150
According to Justice Brandeis: “The mortgage was not voidable as a preference under § 60b. Preference
implies paying or securing a preexisting debt of the person preferred. The mortgage was given to secure Dean
for a substantially contemporary advance. The bank, not Dean, was preferred. The use of Dean’s money to
accomplish this purpose could not convert the transaction into a preferring of Dean . . . . Mere circuity of
arrangement will not save a transfer which effects a preference from being invalid as such.” Id. at 443.
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same funds. That the DOE requires that the loan proceeds be remitted directly
to the university does not change the fact that D opted to borrow without
receiving the loan proceeds. The loan, obviously, dilutes the debtor’s estate
thereby harming each unsecured creditor of D on a pro rata basis.
The university should not be liable for receiving the DOE loan, but for the
reason that it is not the initial transferee of the fraudulent transfer. Rather, D
borrowed from the DOE to benefit X, the adult child. As agent of D and of X,
the DOE conveys X’s property to the university. D first makes the gift of loan
proceeds to X and then (as X’s agent) arranges for the DOE to pay the tuition
bill. On this preferred analysis, the university obtains the good faith transferee
defense in Bankruptcy Code § 551(b)(1).
III. MERE CONDUIT
In the Brooklyn Law School case, the court, Solomon-style, ruled that
sometimes the school is liable and sometimes it is not. But the criterion for
distinguishing liability from non-liability is arbitrary. This arbitrariness stems
from the invocation of the legal fiction of mere conduit.
“Conduit” was a phrase Justice Cardozo once used. In Carson v. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York,151 a bank wrote checks to the Federal Reserve Bank
(FRB), which was a collecting agent for other banks with whom checks had been
deposited.152 The checks bounced and the FRB demanded that the drawer bank
pay the amounts of the dishonored checks. The drawer bank did so and soon
filed for bankruptcy. Since the FRB was acting for other entities, the FRB was
acquitted of voidable preference. Judge Cardozo said, “The person to be charged
with liability, if he has parted before the bankruptcy with title and possession,
must have been more than a mere custodian, an intermediary or conduit between
the bankrupt and the creditor.”153
In modern times, Bonded Financial Services v. European American Bank154
is considered the seminal case of “mere conduit.”155 Bonded is a case rife with
unacknowledged contradiction.156 Much simplified, the case involves D
instructing its bank to debit D’s account and to credit X’s account with the same

151
152
153
154
155
156

Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 N.E. 475 (N.Y. 1930).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988).
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
This is documented in Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14.
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bank.157 Properly, the bank was neither a transferee nor a transferor.158 At one
moment the bank owed D. Following D’s order, the bank owed X. The bank’s
duty to pay was the thing transferred.159 There were no bank deposits of new
funds in the case.160
Nevertheless, Judge Frank Easterbrook confused matters by proclaiming
that the bank was a transferee that was not a transferee.161 Rather, the bank was
a conduit. Judge Easterbrook read § 550(a)(1) as excluding mere conduits from
being transferees.162
In the course of unnecessarily visiting the definition of “transferee,” Judge
Easterbrook offered a hypothetical under which bank would be a transferee—
and an initial transferee to boot. According to Judge Easterbrook:
If the note accompanying [D’s] check had said: “use this check to
reduce [X’s] loan” instead of “deposit this check into [X’s] account,
§ 550(a)(1) would provide a ready answer. The Bank would be the
“initial transferee” and [X] would be the “entity for whose benefit [the]
transfer was made.”163

This is tantamount to the following claim: X owes CX. D, wishing to enrich X,
tenders the money to CX, who accepts it in discharge of CX’s claim against X.
Supposedly, CX is the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer. X is the person
benefited.164 That is, X is no transferee at all and is a “person benefited” under
§ 550(a)(1). The trustee has the option to pursue CX or X under § 550(a)(1).
Neither is entitled to the good faith transferee defense of § 550(b)(1). Judge
Easterbrook’s unfortunate hypothetical completely overlooks the phenomenon
of subrogation, whereby the bank sells to D the bank’s valuable rights against X.
That is, when D pays the bank, X’s obligation to the bank does not disappear.
The bank sells its rights to D; D receives reasonably equivalent value whenever
X is solvent at the time D conveys funds to the bank.165 Separately, debt
forgiveness is independently a fraudulent transfer. This transfer travels from D
directly to X.166
157

See Bonded Fin. Servs., 838 F.2d at 890.
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 892.
164
See Rupp v. Markgraf, 95 F.3d 936, 937–41 (10th Cir. 1996).
165
See Grochocinsky v. Reliant Interactive Media Corp. (In re General Search.com), 322 B.R. 836, 842–
43 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).
166
See supra text accompanying notes 116–20.
158
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Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical has been read as establishing the following
proposition: If a transferee (CX) is a creditor of X, CX is an initial transferee. But
if CX receives an advance payment, expecting to be a creditor later, CX is not a
transferee, even if CX used the advance payment for its own purposes. Rather, in
receiving the advance payment and owing a refund to X, CX was a mere conduit,
not a transferee. Later, when CX’s contingent claim becomes vested, CX (not a
transferee) becomes a transferee of a transferee. As such, CX is entitled to assert
that CX in good faith accepted the payment in satisfaction of X’s debt,
entitling CX to the bona fide transferee defense of § 550(b)(1).
The purest example of this theory at work is Menotte v. United States (In re
Custom Contractors, LLC)167, where CX (the IRS) was held to be a mere conduit.
X, an insider, had caused D Corp. to pay X’s estimated taxes by sending a check
directly to the IRS.168 X ended up having no income, so the IRS refunded the
entire payment to X. X did not remit the refund to D Corp., as he should have
done. D Corp. was soon bankrupt.
D’s bankruptcy trustee sued the IRS as the initial transferee of a fraudulent
transfer.169 The court ruled, however, that the IRS was a mere conduit. The IRS
was the “initial recipient”170 of a transfer but it was not the initial transferee.
According to the Custom court, when D conveys to CX in discharge of X’s
obligation to CX, CX is an initial transferee, contrary to what has been argued
here. “Implicit in these cases is the principle that funds received as payment of
a debt leave the recipient with no obligations; that is, the transferee receives them
with no strings attached.”171
But where, as a result of D’s transfer, CX owes repayment to X, CX has no
control over the transferred property, even though CX is free to use D’s dollars
for its own purposes. When CX is a bank receiving funds from D for the benefit
of X, CX is a mere conduit:
Our case law, then, stands for the proposition that, when a bank
receives funds in the form of a deposit, the attendant obligations owed
to the transferor [sic]—namely to return the funds upon request—are

167

Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 745 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
D Corp. listed these payments to the IRS as distributions to X. Id. at 1345.
169
Actually, X was probably an embezzler. If so, this was no fraudulent transfer case, and the court had
no need to ascertain the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1). A fraudulent transfer is a conveyance of legal
and equitable title. An embezzlement at best leaves equitable title in the victim. See Carlson, Mere Conduit,
supra note 14, at 485–491.
170
In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 745 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014).
171
Id. at 1350.
168
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sufficiently important that we will not hold the bank liable as an initial
transferee in spite of the significant control it exercises over the
funds.172

Significantly, this account contains a Freudian slip. When D makes an advance
payment to CX (a bank), CX owes a refund to the transferor. That would be X.
So, D conveyed to X as initial transferee (not to CX). X made an advance payment
to CX, and when CX’s contingent claim against X becomes vested, C expropriates
X’s property. X was the transferor and hence must have been the initial transferee
of D.
Let us visit Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical more slowly. D (wishing to
enrich X) deposits money with CX in expectation CX will perform a service for
X’s benefit. So far, CX is not a transferee. Yet D has alienated the money.
Somebody must be the transferee. That person must be X.
On the other hand, suppose the payment is not in advance of the vesting of
CX’s claim. That is to say, X owes CX at the time of the debt. D gives funds to
CX. On Judge Easterbrook’s hypothetical, CX is the initial transferee.173
This makes no sense. In the case of the advance payment, where CX is not
obliged to segregate the funds, CX has dominion and control over what CX
received from D. In Judge Easterbrook’s colorful phrase, CX is free to buy
“lottery tickets or uranium stocks.”174 Yet these are the same facts when CX has
a vested claim against X. In both cases, CX is a transferee with dominion and
control over the advance payment. Whether CX is obligated to X does not change
this fact.175
As applied to fraudulent tuition, the schools in the Brooklyn case required
advance payment and offered refunds in case of cancellation. According to the
Brooklyn court, schools in this posture are not initial transferees.176 Since D has
made a transfer and since the school is not the transferee, X was the one and only

172

Id.
See Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank., 838 F.2d 890, 891–92 (7th Cir. 1987).
174
Id. at 894.
175
To make matters worse, the bank in Bonded did not even have a duty to honor X’s withdrawals. The
bank had lent money to X and had a right of setoff against X. In short, the bank had control over X’s deposit
account and, on Judge Easterbrook’s control criteria, the bank should have been the initial transferee of D’s
deposit on behalf of X. Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d
716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017) (“As our sister circuits have explained, the account-holder’s right to withdraw the
deposits keeps the bank from obtaining dominion and control.”). Yet there were no bank deposits in Bonded.
So, the bank was not a transferee at all!
176
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 10–11 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
173
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transferee.177 Later, when the school earns the advance payment, the school is
transferee of a transferee. If the school does not know that the parent D is
insolvent, the education bestowed on X is value defending the school under
§ 550(b)(1).178
But when tuition is not paid in advance, the school is the initial transferee.179
And X, by implication, would seem to be a person benefited within the meaning
of Bankruptcy Code § 550(a)(1). The trustee thus has the option of pursuing the
school or X for recovery of the fraudulent transfer.
Where the student X is the initial transferee, is not the school also “the entity
for whose benefit [the] transfer was made[,]” within the meaning of
§ 550(a)(1)?180 If so, the school is deprived all the same of the bona fide
transferee defense, which is available to transferees of transferees.181
This conclusion violates a major holding in Bonded. It will be recalled that,
in Bonded, D ordered a bank to debit D’s deposit account and credit X’s deposit
account, thereby enriching X. It so happened that X also owed the bank on a
secured loan. Six weeks after, X used the deposit account to pay down the bank
loan.182 The Bonded court viewed the bank as a transferee of a transferee in good
faith. As such, the court held the bank was entitled to the good faith transferee
defense of § 550(b)(1).183 This much is not controverted.
The bankruptcy trustee in Bonded countered that, although the bank may
have been the transferee of a transferee, the bank also benefited by the deposit,
because the “deposit” was eventually used to pay the bank.184 As a person
benefited under § 550(a)(1), the bank was not eligible for the good faith
transferee defense of § 550(b)(1). Sensibly, Judge Easterbrook responded that,
once labeled a transferee of a transferee, D Bank was constitutively incapable of
being an entity for whose benefit the initial transfer was made. Any other
conclusion would deny to a transferee of a transferee the § 550(b) good faith
defense: “The structure of the statute separates initial transferees and
beneficiaries, on the one hand, from ‘immediate or mediate transferee[s],’ on the
177

Id. at 9.
20 U.S.C. § 151 (2019).
179
Pergament, 595 B.R. at 18.
180
Id. at 7; see 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2019).
181
See 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (making the defense available to entities described in subsection (a)(2).
182
See Bonded Fin. Servs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 892–93 (7th Cir. 1988).
183
Id. at 897–98.
184
Id. at 891. The trustee’s position is compromised by the fact that there was no deposit in Bonded. The
transfer was accomplished by an “on us” check issued by D for the benefit of X. See supra text accompanying
notes 152–58.
178
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other. The implication is that the ‘entity for whose benefit’ is different from a
transferee, ‘immediate’ or otherwise.”185 This is sound statutory interpretation,
though one must admit that every transferee of a transferee is benefited by the
initial transfer.
To be noted is that Judge Easterbrook read § 550(a)(1) in a way to assure
that a transferee of a transferee receives access to the good faith transfer defense.
Why then can we not read § 550(a)(1) in such a way as to provide Brooklyn Law
School with a good faith transfer defense? We have seen that such a triangle is
drawn to solve an important subset of voidable preference cases. Such a triangle
should be conjured in fraudulent tuition cases, in order to assure that universities
obtain the bona fide transfer defense.186
I end this section with a suggestion that demonstrates the perversity of the
Brooklyn case. The court relied heavily on the fact that the student owned the
refund if the student decided to cancel prior to registration day. Because of this
supposed fact, Brooklyn Law School was potentially a transferee of a transferee
entitled to the bona fide transfer defense in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1). The
decision includes this footnote: “The trustee’s subsequent assertion that ‘the
Debtor limited his children’s right to use the Tuition Payments for any purpose
other than paying tuition’ . . . is conclusory and unsupported by the record.”187
What if a trustee can prove that the adult child X agreed that if X canceled school
X held the refund in trust for D? It is rather hard to say, prior to registration day,
that X has received a fraudulent transfer. At best, X has received legal title to a
contingent refund held in trust for D. In that case, the school has received tuition
dollars with the obligation to return them in case of school cancellation. This is
no fraudulent transfer either, since D receives a reasonably equivalent value
from the school when it transfers refundable dollars to the school. Now suppose
the semester begins. The tuition is no longer refundable. It seems to me that the
school is the initial transferee of a fraudulent transfer, in spite of the advance
payment of tuition. Before the semester begins, D has an equitable right to a
refund. After the semester begins, D gives up this right and the university is
enriched. If this is correct, then school liability turns entirely on the agreement
185

Id. at 895.
Courts in tripartite fraudulent transfer cases like to “collapse” triangles in order to make the case
bipartite and easy to solve, as the bona fide purchaser defense of value-paying defendants is eliminated. See
United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d Cir. 1986); CNB Int’l, Inc. Litig. Tr. v.
Lloyds TSB Bank plc (In re CNB Int’l, Inc.), 440 B.R. 31, 42–45 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). What I propose here is the
opposite. A straight line is to be made triangular. In mathematics, this is known as a “lifting” homomorphism in
a short exact sequence of ring modules—a straight line between two objects is made into a triangle between
three objects. DAVID S. DUMMIT & RICHARD M. FOOTE, ABSTRACT ALGEBRA 385–88 (3d ed. 2003).
187
Pergament v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 595 B.R. 6, 14, n. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
186
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between parent and child with regard to the refund. It is very difficult for school
administrators to guard against this possibility. Insisting on advance payment
would not suffice to ward off liability. All this nonsense is eliminated if it is
agreed that the student is always the initial transferee of fraudulent tuition. In
such a case the school is transferee of a transferee and entitled to the defense
accorded to bona fide transfers in Bankruptcy Code § 550(b)(1).
IV. THE LIABILITY OF STUDENTS
Among the courts that have considered the matter, a majority holds that the
tuition-paying insolvent parent receives no reasonably equivalent value when an
adult child is educated. On this assumption, there is a fraudulent transfer, but
who is liable? I have suggested that a good faith school is never liable because
it is always a transferee of a transferee with the § 550(b)(1) defense. It therefore
follows that the adult child is liable as the initial transferee.188
Since X dissipates the contractual right to an education by actually being
educated, there are no longer any tangible proceeds of tuition that can be turned
over to the bankruptcy trustee. Education is a “wasting asset.”189 Therefore, the
trustee can expect a money judgment to be issued against X. According to
Bankruptcy Code § 550(a), in the case of a fraudulent transfer, “the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property” from the initial transferee.190 If X is like most
recent graduates, a six-figure judgment for the value of the education renders X
insolvent.
X’s liability for tuition will likely bankrupt X. May X escape this judgment
by seeking discharge in bankruptcy? Unhappily, X may find that X’s obligation
to D is not dischargeable for two reasons; first, the Supreme Court may have
held that judgments for receipt of a fraudulent transfer are not dischargeable.191
188
But see Lo v. Lee, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1065, 1072–75 (2018). The court seems to be disagreeing. In that
case, the California Court of Appeal accepted a lower court determination that the parent D received reasonably
equivalent value when child X was educated. That should have ended the matter. If there was no fraudulent
transfer, X is off the hook. Unnecessarily the court held X was not a “person benefited” under California law:
the benefits of an education are not quantifiable. Therefore, X had no liability. It may be protested that X’s
contract with the university was proceeds of the tuition payment. If tuition was a fraudulent transfer, then the
education contract was the proceeds. Thus, even if X did not benefit from being educated, X was a transferee of
a transferee and potentially liable, if indeed the tuition payment was fraudulent.
189
See supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
190
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2019) (emphasis added).
191
Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1589 (2016). For detailed analysis, see David Gray
Carlson, The Supreme Court, Dischargeability, and Actual Fraud, 27 Am Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. (2020)
(forthcoming).
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Second, the student has received an educational benefit (tuition) that must be
repaid. That makes the fraudulent transfer a student loan. Student loans are not
dischargeable, unless repaying it causes an undue hardship to the student.192
A. Receipt of a Fraudulent Transfer
Bankruptcy practitioners know that giving a conveyance intended to hinder
creditors prevents any discharge for D in bankruptcy.193 Less well-known is that
receipt of a fraudulent transfer arguably gives rise to a nondischargeable
obligation under §523(a)(2) with respect to “property . . . obtained by . . . actual
fraud . . . .” This is so under one reading of the Supreme Court’s perplexing
decision in Husky International Electronics v. Ritz.194
In Ritz, D Corp owed CD for goods sold on unsecured credit. No one made
a misrepresentation regarding this credit sale.195 So far, we have a breach of
contract claim—archetypically dischargeable.
On the eve of D Corp.’s collapse, X (the controlling shareholder of D Corp.)
arranged a transfer of D Corp. funds to another corporation (X Corp.) of which
X was also a shareholder.196 Later, X filed for bankruptcy.
At first glance, it would seem that X was no transferee of D Corp. property.
Rather, X Corp was. But Texas law invites imposing liability on shareholders of
a corporation if that individual “caused the corporation to be used for the purpose
of perpetrating . . . an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct
personal benefit of the holder . . . .”197
CD sought to impose liability on X under this statute. CD, however, was most
vague on whether CD was seeking to pierce the veil of D Corp. or the veil of X
Corp. If CD was seeking to pierce the D Corp. veil, CD’s theory against X was
breach of a sales agreement between D Corp. and CD.198 Such claims are
dischargeable, provided no misrepresentations were made in getting CD to
extend unsecured credit.
192

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019).
See § 727(a)(2).
194
See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1589.
195
See id. at 1589–90.
196
X Corp. is a composite of seven different subsidiaries in which X owned some or all the shares. See In
re Ritz, 832 F.3d 560, 563, n.1 (5th Cir. 2016).
197
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2007).
198
See In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 632 (“Unquestionably, the debt that [C] owed to it is based on D Corp.s
breach of contract”). See also Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1591–92 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (assuming
C’s theory against X was for breach of a sales contract).
193
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If CD was seeking to pierce the X Corp. veil, then CD’s theory was that, as a
creditor of D Corp., CD could reach the property D Corp. fraudulently
transferred to X Corp. If, thanks to veil-piercing, X was the same person as X
Corp., CD could have judgment against X for receiving a fraudulent transfer. But,
by virtue of D Corp.’s bankruptcy proceeding, such a cause of action did not
belong to CD. Rather, it belonged to D Corp.’s bankruptcy trustee. CD had no
business pursuing this cause of action and was indeed in violation of the
automatic stay arising in the D Corp. bankruptcy for doing so—a fact that the
Supreme Court would overlook.
To further confuse the picture, X was an embezzling insider of D Corp. This
means that we are not facing a fraudulent transfer case at all! Rather, we are
looking at a case of stolen funds.199 “A thief cannot pass good title.”200 A
fraudulent transfer implies the transfer of title from D Corp. to X Corp.201
Whether we have a voluntary transfer by D Corp. turns on whether X was within
the scope of his authority as D Corp.’s agent when X transferred D Corp. funds
to X Corp. Typically, transfers out of the ordinary course of business must be
approved by the board of directors of a corporation.202 There is no evidence in
any of the reported opinions that such authority existed.
If I am right that X was an embezzler and D Corp. was the victim of a theft,
then X Corp. is obligated to reimburse D Corp. for conversion or on a
restitutionary theory of unjust enrichment. X (the thief) is also obligated to return
the stolen funds. This obligation is itself nondischargeable,203 but it is not a cause
of action that belongs to CD. Rather, D Corp. owns this cause of action, and since
D Corp. was bankrupt, the cause of action is part of D Corp.’s bankruptcy estate.
We shall, however, waive this point and treat X’s embezzlement as D Corp.’s
fraudulent transfer to X Corp. But the price of this waiver is that we must

199

See Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14, at 485–491.
Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2010).
201
The Supreme Court, incidentally, identifies X, as the transferor of a fraudulent transfer, not a thief (or
transferee) of funds. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (“courts and legislature have used the term
‘fraud’ to describe a debtor’s transfer of assets that, like Ritz’s scheme, impairs a creditor’s ability to collect the
debt.”).
202
See Carlson, Mere Conduit, supra note 14.
203
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2019) (preventing discharge of a claim arising from “fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny”). C had sought to bar X’s liability for its breach of
contract claim on this ground. The bankruptcy court dismissed this claim on the general proposition that X, as
officer of D Corp., owed not fiduciary duty to the creditors of D Corp. Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz),
459 B.R. 623, 633–34 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). The bankruptcy court also ruled that X could not be denied a
discharge under § 523(a)(6) (“willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property to
another entity”). Whereas X did embezzle from D Corp., X did not injure any property of C. Id. at 635.
200
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consider that X was acting in the proper scope of his authority when he caused
D Corp. to transfer funds to X Corp. for no fair consideration. The presence of a
fraudulent transfer means that X is to be acquitted of the charge of
embezzlement.
Initially, the bankruptcy court in Ritz ruled that X was not liable for D Corp.’s
breach of contract claim to CD.204 And even if such a debt did exist, the court
opined, it would be dischargeable. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), thought the
bankruptcy court, requires a misrepresentation of fact by X, and X made no
misrepresentations.205 X simply embezzled funds from D Corp. on behalf of X
Corp.
CD appealed from the bankruptcy court’s decision that denied X’s liability to
CD. The district court affirmed. The district court did find, however, that X could
be liable for the breach of contract if X made a fraudulent transfer. That is to say,
the district court viewed X as the transferor, not the transferee.206 It must have
been the case, however, that the district court pierced the X Corp. veil and
confounded this with piercing the D Corp. veil.207
The district court nevertheless affirmed the bankruptcy court. The fraudulent
transfer to X Corp. was not a misrepresentation to CD to induce CD to extend
unsecured credit to D Corp. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
along the same lines.208

204

Id. at 632–33.
Id. at 635.
206
Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 513 B.R. 510, 537 (S.D. Tex. 2014). (“He drained [D Corp.] of
funds and fraudulently transferred those funds to other entities under his control and/or ownership . . . .”)
(alteration added).
207
In support of the conclusion is the fact that the district court relied on Spring St. Partners IV, L.P. v,
Lam, 730 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 2013), which had been handed down after the bankruptcy court’s opinion in Ritz.
In Lam, D conveyed a valuable thing to X Corp., of which X was shareholder. D then filed for bankruptcy. CD
then sued X because X Corp. received a fraudulent transfer. The court of appeals upheld a judgment against X.
for the fraudulent transfer received by X Corp. The district court’s reliance on Lam leads to the view that the X
Corp. veil was the one being pierced. On remand, the bankruptcy court emphasized that X was the recipient of
D Corp.’s fraudulent transfer. This assumes piercing the X Corp. veil. Husky Int’l Elecs. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 567
B.R. 715, 761–62 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).
208
See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d 312, 316–21 (5th Cir. 2015).
205
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By the time the Supreme Court took the case, no court had actually held that
X was liable on CD’s claim.209 The Supreme Court assumed that X had already
been held liable to CX210—but for what?
A plausible reading of Ritz is that X was liable because X Corp. had received
a fraudulent transfer from D Corp. (That is, the Supreme Court had assumed that
the X Corp. veil had been pierced to establish X’s liability). This reading is
consistent with the following passage from Ritz: “[T]he recipient of a
transfer—who, with the requisite intent, also commits fraud—can ‘obtai[n]’
assets ‘by’ his or her participation in the fraud. If that recipient later files for
bankruptcy, any debts ‘traceable to’ the fraudulent conveyance will be
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).”211 Such a reading of Ritz is bad news
for students. Ritz may mean that a money judgment against a fraudulent transfer
recipient is not dischargeable in bankruptcy when parent D intended to hinder
creditors.
Students, however, may be able to distinguish Ritz on the facts. In Ritz, X
was an active participant in the fraud. X was the controlling shareholder of D
Corp., who caused D Corp. to issue checks to X Corp. Students may be less
blameworthy; they may be passive recipients of fraudulent tuition. Therefore,
money judgments for passive receipt of a fraudulent transfer may still be
dischargeable in spite of Ritz.
Students are certainly capable of conspiring with their parents with regard to
tuition payments. That is undoubtedly a finding of fact. Nondischargeability
certainly follows if the student knows the parent is insolvent at the time the
tuition is paid. If the theory in tuition cases, however, is constructive fraudulent
transfer, then a tuition case differs from that of Ritz. The theory in Ritz was actual
fraudulent transfer (though there was also an overlapping constructive
fraudulent transfer theory). And the words in Bankruptcy Code § 523(a) are
actual fraud (not constructive fraud).212
209
Compare Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2016) (“The District court held that
Ritz was personally liable for the debt under Texas law . . . .”) with Husky Int’l Elecs. Inc., v. Ritz (In re Ritz),
832 F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2016) (on remand, “[w]e are . . . required to consider the issue that we pretermitted
on [C’s] appeal to this court: whether [X] owes a debt to [C] under Texas law. We do so because if [X] is not
liable to [C] under Texas law, then there is no debt to discharge and the question of the deniability of a discharge
under § 523(a)(2)(A) is moot”).
210
“The district court held that [X] was personally liable for the debt under Texas law.” See Husky Int’l
Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1585.
211
Id. (internal citations omitted).
212
According to Justice Sotomayor:
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Prior to Ritz, the leading case on receipt of fraudulent transfers was
McClellan v. Cantrell.213 Here, the court distinguishes sharply between
constructive and actual fraudulent transfers:
The fraud exception to the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy does
not reach constructive frauds, only actual ones . . . . To transfer
property for less than adequate consideration may be desperate,
foolish, or imprudent, and the receipt of such a transfer a pure windfall,
but neither the transfer nor the receipt is in and of itself dishonest, and
so neither is an appropriate ground for refusing to allow the debtor to
discharge the debt arising from the transfer and thus to get on with his
life without the debt hanging over his head.214

Courts may use this ploy to limit the consequences of Ritz on behalf of
students. But the ploy depends on the finding that the parent was not guilty of
an actual fraud when the parent wrote the tuition check.215 If the check was
written against the background of obvious insolvency, then the parent can be
found to have the bad intent. After all, it is part of the black-letter definition of
intent that an actor intends the result he knows is certain to occur.216 Indeed,
insolvency at the time of transfer is a “badge of fraud”—evidence of actual intent
to hinder, delay or defraud.217 Many constructive fraudulent transfers are also
actual fraudulent transfers.218

Actual fraud” has two parts: actual and fraud. The word “actual” has a simple meaning in the
context of common-law fraud: It denotes any fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or intentional
wrong. “Actual” fraud stands in contrast to “implied” fraud or fraud “in law,” which describe acts
of deception that “may exist without imputation of ad faith or immorality.” Thus, anything that
counts as “fraud” and is done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud.
Id. at 1586 (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878) (alteration added).
213
McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893–95 (7th Cir. 2000).
214
Id. at 894. McCllellan would not seem to be a real fraudulent transfer case. A fraudulent transfer
requires a transfer of debtor property with intent to hinder, etc. McClellan involved the transfer of a machine
encumbered by an unperfected security interest. The conveyance of D’s equity to X was arguably honest and
appropriate. See U.C.C. § 9-401(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“whether a debtor’s rights in
collateral may be voluntarily . . . transferred is governed by law other than this article.”). The wrong in the case
was when X sold the machine to a bona fide purchaser who took free and clear of the security interest, and when
X converted the Article 9 proceeds to her own use. See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010). Properly, X’s debt for conversion was nondischargeable Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(6).
215
Derek Huish reports that allegations of actual fraud exist in 27% of the cases as of 2019. See Derek A.
Huish, Note, Clawing Back Tuition Payments in Bankruptcy: Looking to Ancient and Recent History to Define
the Future, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2151, 2159, 2189 (2019).
216
Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489, 504 (Ohio 1988) (defining an intentional tort
as “an act committed . . . with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur”).
217
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b)(9) (“In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1),
consideration may be given, among other factors to where . . . (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
shortly after the transfer was made . . . .”).
218
Kettering, Choice of Law, supra note 31, at 357.
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Thus, the student obtains a discharge if the parent has no intent to hinder
creditors or, if such intent exists, the student had no knowledge of this intent.219
B. The Fraudulent Transfer as a Type of Student Loan
Even if Ritz is not an obstacle to dischargeability, another problem impedes
the student’s discharge. The fraudulent transfer to X (the student) qualifies as a
student loan. Under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(8) student loans are not
dischargeable “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s
dependents . . . . ”220
Student loans are accorded much definition in Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(8).
One of the definitions applies to receipt of a fraudulent education. According to
§ 523(a)(8)(A)(ii), a general discharge does not operate on “an obligation to
repay funds received as an educational benefit . . . .” The student X, ex hypothesi,
is the initial transferee of tuition from insolvent parent D. Fraudulent transfer
law requires X to repay these funds to D’s bankruptcy trustee. Thus, unless X
can show undue hardship, X has still received an educational benefit that,
according to fraudulent transfer theory, must be repaid. Thus, the fraudulent
transfer constitutes a nondischargeable student loan.
C. The Student’s Obligation to Reimburse a School Held Liable for
Fraudulent Tuition
The first two subsections cover the case where the school is accorded a bona
fide transferee defense because it is the transferee of a transferee and X is the
initial transferee of the tuition gift. Suppose, contrary to what has been argued
here, the school has to pay as initial transferee. If the school is liable, then X
must pay all the same. Because the school’s contract is with the student and
because the payment has been avoided, the school may sue X for the tuition.
219
See Sauer Inc v. Lawson (In re Lawson), 791 F.3d 214, 220 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2443 (2016):

[T]he debtor-transferee must herself be “guilty of intent to defraud” and not merely be the passive
recipient of a fraudulent conveyance. Such intent may be inferred from her acceptance of a
transfer that she knew was made for the purpose of hindering the transferor’s creditor(s), but it
may not be implied as a matter of law.
220
On what constitutes an undue hardship, see generally Richard B. Keeton, Guaranteed to Work or It’s
Free!: The Evolution of Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy and the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in Hedlund v.
Educational Resources Institute Inc., 89 Am. Bankr. L.J. 65, 74–94 (2015); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey,
Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74
U. Cin. L. Rev. 405 (2005).

CARLSONPROOFS_6.8.20

2020]

6/8/2020 11:45 AM

TUITION AS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER

57

Because they may be avoided as preferences or as fraudulent transfers,
payments in general can never be considered final. An example is Security First
National Bank v. Brunson (In re Coutee).221 In this case, a law firm guaranteed
a bank loan to the client. The firm paid the bank slightly before bankruptcy,
using the client’s settlement that the firm has received from a personal injury
defendant. The firm’s guaranty was seemingly satisfied and discharged. But
when the client’s bankruptcy trustee recovered the bank’s payment as a voidable
preference, the law firm’s obligation under the guaranty revived. The bank’s
payment turned out to have been conditional, and its avoidance put the parties
in status quo ante.
Thus, if there really is a fraudulent transfer in the picture, it is X, now welleducated and with an advanced degree from the School of Hard Knocks, that
pays the tuition bill. Either X has a nondischargeable liability to the bankruptcy
trustee of her parents, or the university may sue X for ultimately failing to pay
tuition—a claim that is also not dischargeable (in the absense of undue
hardship).
CONCLUSION
Tuition payments to universities by insolvent parents on behalf of their adult
children may be fraudulent transfers. This depends on whether the parent
received reasonably equivalent value when an adult child received the golden
gift of education. Courts are split on this question, and on this point I am
agnostic. But I have also shown that universities are not the initial transferees of
fraudulent tuition. Rather, the student is the initial transferee. The school
receives student dollars even when the parent cuts a check directly to the
university. If this is recognized, the nightmare of “mere conduit” analysis can be
discarded as an unnecessary fiction. Universities that educate in good faith are
never liable because an insolvent parent wrote a tuition check directly to a
university.

221

See In re Coutee, 984 F.2d 138, 140–41 (5th Cir. 1993).

